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INJURY-IN-FACT IN CHILLING EFFECT 
CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SPEECH 
CODES 
Jennifer L. Bruneau+ 
It is shortly after 9/11 and emotions are running high throughout the country.1  
Patriotism abounds, but so does fear and insecurity with the prospect of war 
looming.  Some students at Public University fully support a war effort while 
others are adamantly opposed to the idea.2  Both sides, wanting their voices 
heard on campus, consider organizing rallies in support of their respective 
causes.3  Each of the rallies is likely to produce intense emotional reactions from 
fellow students and, perhaps, even faculty and staff.4 
Public University, like most institutions of public higher education, has a 
policy under which students are expected to avoid disrespecting others’ personal 
feelings.5  The combination of heightened emotions and a vague “personal 
feelings” policy lead the groups to each decide not to hold their rallies for fear 
of punishment.6  This motivation to self-censor because of the school’s policy is 
called a “chilling effect.”7 
                                                          
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2007, Dickinson College.  The author would like to thank attorneys Jeff Shafer and David Hacker 
for their invaluable expertise and feedback throughout the writing process as well as her colleagues 
at the Catholic University Law Review for their editing assistance.  The author would also like to 
thank her family and friends for their love, support, and prayers without which this Comment could 
not have been written. 
 1. The hypothetical that follows is modeled after events that transpired on Yale University’s 
campus following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS 
CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE 78–80 (2012).  See also Naomi Massave, Hate 
Sign Removed from Durfee Hall, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2001, http://yaledailynews.com/ 
blog/2001/10/30/hate-sign-removed-from-durfee-hall/. 
 2. See, e.g., LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 78–79.  In the aftermath of 9/11, both students and 
faculty on Yale’s campus “were angry and upset about the attacks and wanted the United States to 
go after the terrorists.”  Id. at 79.  However, some students did not favor the “[k]ill em’ all” 
mentality and threatened “campus-wide protests.”  Id. 
 3. See, e.g., id. (discussing how one group of students expressed its thoughts through an anti-
peace banner while another group threatened to protest throughout the entire campus). 
 4. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, The Changing Styles of Student Protests, 8 MODERATOR 17 (1969), 
http://www.jofreeman.com/sixtiesprotest/styles.htm (describing how the University of Chicago 
dealt with “intense emotional experiences” during and after student protests on campus). 
 5. See, e.g., Student Rights and Obligations, TEX. A&M UNIV. (Aug. 8, 2013), http:// 
policies.tamus.edu/13-02.pdf.  
 6. See, e.g., LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 79–81 (discussing two instances on Yale’s campus 
where students received negative reactions to expressing their opinions). 
 7. See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1633, 1648–55 (2013) (providing an overview of the chilling effect). 
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Broadly, “[a] chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in 
activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from so doing by 
governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”8  In 
the context of speech restriction policies on campuses, it is explained as self-
censorship by those who fear discipline because it appears certain that their 
speech will be punishable under the policy.9  Campus speech codes began to 
spring up on university campuses during the 1980s and continue to operate 
today.10  The codes regulate various forms of arguably offensive speech, 
including speech regarding race, gender, sexual orientation, ideology, views, and 
political affiliation.11  Numerous litigants have challenged the chilling effect 
these policies have on student and faculty speech.12 
Most schools do not have a policy labeled “speech code”; rather, they exist 
within codes of conduct, harassment policies, and email policies.13  For example, 
University of Oregon’s Residence Hall Conduct Policy states, “[a]ny resident’s 
behavior that . . . demonstrates an unwillingness to live in a group setting is 
prohibited.”14  Speech codes can also be found in policies that create campus 
                                                          
 8. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling 
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis removed). 
 9. See Kendrick, supra note 7, at 1652–55 (explaining how the chilling effect causes 
speakers to remain silent); LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 43–45 (providing examples of university 
regulations on speech). 
 10. See Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of 
Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 486–88 (2009) (providing a brief history 
of the rise of speech codes).  Various explanations exist for the installation of speech codes on 
college campuses.  Id. at 486.  Some propose that the codes were designed to ensure a safe campus 
environment for minorities and that these policies were responsive to racial violence and other 
forms of intolerance.  Id. at 486–87.  Others claim that the speech codes were a “quick fix” to deflect 
media attention away from the problem of racial violence.  Id. at 487.  Finally, there are those who 
claim that university administrators established speech codes to support the broader political 
correctness movement.  Id. at 487–88. 
 11. LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 38–40, 43–45 (providing a brief overview of the history of 
speech codes and examples).  Doe v. University of Michigan was the first case in which a court 
adjudicated the constitutionality of a public university speech code. 721 F. Supp. 852, 855–56 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989).  At the time the school adopted the challenged anti-discrimination disciplinary policy, 
the university President acknowledged its First Amendment implications; however, he believed 
that the negative impact of “speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously offend 
many individuals beyond the immediate victim” on the “necessary educational climate of a 
campus” outweighed the potential First Amendment issues.  Id. at 855. 
 12. See Majeed, supra note 10, at 488–94 (providing an overview of existing cases, prior to 
the Ninth Circuit’s overturning of the district court’s decision in Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 
(9th Cir. 2010)). 
 13. LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 40–42 (explaining that universities bury speech codes in 
websites, handbooks, and other materials to disguise speech regulations). 
 14. Residence Hall Contract and Community Expectations, UNIV. OF OR. (2014), https:// 
housing.uoregon.edu/hou-includes/duckweb/14-15/uoh-rhcontract-2014.00.pdf (see Conduct 
Policy 3(c)).  Under this policy, the University charged a female student for shouting from her 
dormitory window to another female, who was walking by with her boyfriend, “I hit it first,” as a 
joke.  University of Oregon: Student’s Four-Word Joke Results in Five Unconstitutional 
2015] Chilling Effect Challenges to Public University Speech Codes 977 
“speech zones”15 and sensitivity or diversity training programs.16  For example, 
the University of Delaware once had a mandatory orientation program where 
students were pressured and sometimes required to agree with the University’s 
ideological positions.17 
Speech codes are supported by groups such as the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL), which advocates narrow codes that target “hate speech” and encourages 
school administrators to speak out against hateful speakers.18  On the other hand, 
organizations such as the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) 
and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) oppose speech codes on the 
basis that they violate fundamental rights of free expression.19  Organizations 
opposed to speech codes also challenge such codes to preserve universities’ 
unique place in society as a “marketplace of ideas.”20 
                                                          
Disciplinary Charges, THE FIRE (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.thefire.org/cases/university-oregon-
students-four-word-joke-results-five-unconstitutional-disciplinary-charges/.  The Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) intervened and the charges were eventually dropped.  
Victory: University of Oregon Drops Charges Against Student for Joke, THE FIRE (Aug. 28 2014), 
http://www.thefire.org/victory-university-oregon-drops-charges-student-joke/. 
 15. GREG LUKIANOFF, DAVID FRENCH & HARVEY SILVERGATE, FIRE’S GUIDE TO FREE 
SPEECH ON CAMPUS 153–54 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter LUKIANOFF, FRENCH & SILVERGATE].  For 
example, Texas Tech University had a “free speech gazebo” which was the only place on campus 
in which students could hold free speech activities, such as protests, without prior permission.  Id. 
at 170.  The district court ultimately overturned this policy.  Roberts v. Haragon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 
853, 872–74 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
 16. LUKIANOFF, FRENCH & SILVERGATE, supra note 15, at 165–67. 
 17. Id.  FIRE intervened and the President subsequently eliminated the program.  University 
of Delaware: Students Required to Undergo Ideological Reeducation, THE FIRE (Oct. 30, 2007), 
http://www.thefire.org/cases/university-of-delaware-students-required-to-undergo-ideological-ree 
ducation/. 
 18. See Responding to Bigotry and Intergroup Strife on Campus: Guide for College and 
University Administrators, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://archive.adl.org/campus/guide/ 
free_speech.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). 
 19. FIRE Mission, THE FIRE, http://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission/ (last visited Sept. 6, 
2014); Hate Speech on Campus, ACLU (Dec. 31, 1994), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/hate-
speech-campus. 
 20. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972).  See also LUKIANOFF, FRENCH & 
SILVERGATE, supra note 15, at 154 (“[A] university can and should ban true harassment or threats, 
but a code that calls itself a ‘harassment code’ does not thereby magically free itself from its 
obligations to free speech and academic freedom.”). 
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Speech codes on state university campuses21 raise significant First 
Amendment22 issues because state universities are government entities.23  As 
such, challenges to state university speech codes on First Amendment grounds 
have been successful.24  However, in cases where the challenged code has not 
                                                          
 21. Although speech codes at private universities limit free speech like those at public 
universities, students and professors cannot make First Amendment claims against them because 
there is typically no state action in the enactment of the polices.  Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the 
Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and 
Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1381 (1990).  In cases that implicate constitutional rights, parties 
have argued that private universities engage in state action for several reasons.  Id. at 1382–84.  
Claims based on the receipt of federal funds and the “public function” of educational institutions 
have been generally rejected.  Id. at 1383.  In some cases, the courts have found state action when 
state officials were involved with the institution’s administration.  Id. at 1384.  The courts have also 
found state action when someone has challenged a private institution on the basis of race or sex 
discrimination, but have not used this as a valid basis to permit a First Amendment claim, despite 
its purported importance to the country’s social fabric.  Id. at 1384–85.  Litigation over private 
university speech codes will not be discussed here because there is only one known case regarding 
a private university speech code.  Jennifer Ross, Keeping Free Speech Free in the College 
Marketplace of Ideas: California Legislation as an Imperfect Solution to Censorship by University 
Administrators, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 727, 743 n.107 (2007).  In that case, the court struck down the 
university’s harassment policy on overbreadth grounds under the state’s Leonard Law, which 
allows students of private educational institutions to bring free speech claims.  Corry v. Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309, 41–42 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), http://web.stanford. 
edu/~evwayne/library/corrym.html.  Nearly two decades prior, a similar federal measure, the 
Collegiate Speech Protection Act, was introduced to the House of Representatives.  H.R. 1380, 
102d Cong. (1991).  See also Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech 
Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 
1469, 1493–94 (1991).  The Bill established a cause of action for both public and private college 
and university students to challenge “any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely 
on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication protected from governmental 
restriction by the first article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at 1493.  
The House referred the bill to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Rights where 
it appears to have stalled.  Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 1380, LIBRARY OF CONG., 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:H.R.1380:@@@L (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 22. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  Speech codes have been challenged on grounds such as overbreadth, vagueness, or 
discrimination on the basis of content or viewpoint.  See Majeed, supra note 10, at 494–99 
(describing each of these claims). 
 23. See Bernard D. Reams, Revocation of Academic Degrees by Colleges and Universities, 
14 J.C. & U.L. 283, 293 (1987) (“The activities of a state-owned or state-operated university fall 
immediately within the state action doctrine, and therefore, must adhere to fourteenth amendment 
due process requirements.”).  See also Siegel, supra note 21, at 1365–66 (summarizing Doe v. 
University of Michigan); Private Universities, THE FIRE, http://www.thefire.org/spotlight/public-
and-private-universities/ (last visited September 3, 2014) (explaining that private universities are 
not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 24. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding a sexual 
harassment policy facially overbroad); Roberts v. Haragon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 871–73 (N.D. 
Tex. 2004) (finding a speech code facially overbroad); Booher v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ., 
No. 2:96-CV-135, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404, at *26–33 (E.D. Ky. July 21, 1998) (holding that 
the sexual harassment policy was overbroad and vague); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down a discriminatory 
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yet been enforced, some courts find that the plaintiff has not met the “injury-in-
fact” requirement for Article III standing.25  The Supreme Court has not ruled 
on standing requirements in speech code challenges and lower courts are 
divided.26  This Comment analyzes this division and provides a proposal for the 
best resolution of the standing question in this context. 
Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s approach to standing standards in pre-
enforcement challenges to speech restrictions and to the “special concern of the 
First Amendment” in education.27  Part II discusses the various ways that lower 
courts have ruled on plaintiffs’ standing in their pre-enforcement “chilling 
effect” challenges to public university speech codes.  Part III analyzes why these 
divisions exist among the courts.  Part IV argues that the injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III standing is satisfied in pre-enforcement challenges to 
public university speech codes upon an allegation of self-censorship vindicated 
by a showing that the plaintiffs’ speech would arguably be proscribed by the 
code. 
I.  STANDING REQUIREMENTS, PRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS, AND THE SPECIAL 
TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS IN EDUCATION 
A.  General Standing Requirements 
Like much of modern jurisprudence, the history and development of standing 
doctrine is complex.  The distinction between public and private rights was 
central to its early development.28  Historically, private rights were those held 
by individuals, such as the rights to life, liberty, and property.29  In private rights 
cases, courts based justiciability on whether the plaintiff had asserted the correct 
form of action.30  To establish standing, a plaintiff only had to assert the relevant 
violation of his right; a further showing of actual harm was not required.31  In 
                                                          
harassment policy that the court found overbroad and vague); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 
852, 866–67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invalidating a discriminatory harassment policy for being 
overbroad and vague).  Litigation is just one of many means available to oppose speech codes on 
college campuses.  See Majeed, supra note 10, at 540–43 (suggesting that public exposure and 
advocacy as well as efforts to change the cultural norms regarding political correctness are other 
ways of combating speech codes). 
 25. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the cases in which standing has been an issue).  
This Comment assumes that once an injury has occurred, causation and redressability are satisfied. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 28. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
275, 289 (2008). 
 29. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 689, 693 (2004).  See also Hessick, supra note 28, at 280–81. 
 30. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 29, at 693 (describing this legal standard). 
 31. Hessick, supra note 28, at 280–81 (explaining that no proof of harm was necessary in 
private legal actions under the common law).  See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) 
(“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and 
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contrast, public rights were those that “belong[ed] to the body politic[,]” such as 
rights of navigation and highway access.32  Public rights were thought better 
defended by the legislature and through criminal law enforcement.33 
The “power to create new rights and to redefine existing rights”34 has blurred 
the distinction between the historically different approaches applied to these two 
categories of rights.  As a result, modern standing doctrine emerged in part to 
“protect[] legislation from judicial attack,” as assertions of constitutional rights 
were increasingly used to challenge legislative and regulatory expansion.35  
Further, federal courts needed a way to hear claims registered by individuals 
whose rights were violated by government agency action.36  To address these 
changes in the legal system, the Supreme Court eventually adopted the “injury-
in-fact” requirement.37 
Arguably, the Court did not initially intend to apply the injury-in-fact standard 
to traditional private rights cases.38  However, with time, the Court applied it to 
all rights because of concern that permissive court access was facilitating undue 
judicial interference with state and federal government power.39  After 
establishing a single standing measure, the historically more lenient approach to 
                                                          
not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy 
for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
 32. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 29, at 693.  But see Hessick, supra note 28, at 290–91 
(citing Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824); Tyler v. Judges of Court of 
Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900)).  In Tyler, the Court noted that the plaintiff had to “show an 
interest in the suit personal to himself” when suing on behalf of another person or on behalf of the 
public.  179 U.S. at 406.  Some argue that this is a precursor to modern standing doctrine, but it 
does not require that the plaintiff establish a harm, only an interest.  Hessick, supra note 28, at 290–
91 nn.90–91. 
 33. Hessick, supra note 28, at 279–80.  Public rights are those that should be vindicated 
through the legislative process, such as “the right . . . to require that the Government be administered 
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.  Obviously this general right does not 
entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit . . . .”  Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 
126, 129–30 (1922).  See also Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 29, at 695–700 (explaining this 
position). 
 34. See Hessick, supra note 28, at 291, 293–94; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 29, at 
694. 
 35. Hessick, supra note 28, at 291.  See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Name 
of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (holding that Society of Sisters had standing 
because a regulation violated its Fourteenth Amendment rights and the threat of enforcement was 
impacting the viability of its schools). 
 36. Hessick, supra note 28, at 293.  But see Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 29, at 710 
(summarizing the position that exceptions to the “form of action” requirement demonstrate that the 
doctrine was not static and that the philosophy behind this doctrine protected the separation of 
powers; therefore, although not explicitly called “standing,” the idea existed prior to the twentieth 
century). 
 37. Hessick, supra note 28, at 293 (citing Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
152 (1970)). 
 38. Id. at 295. 
 39. Id. at 296–98. 
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private claim standing was reintroduced to certain cases through “prudential” 
standing requirements.40 
The Court cemented Article III standing41 requirements in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife.42  Summarizing various standing cases, the Court set out the 
following Article III standing requirements: (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) causation 
that is “fairly traceable” to the challenged conduct, and (3) redressability of the 
injury by the remedy sought.43  Further, the injury must be “(a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”44 
The Lujan Article III standing standards are constitutional requirements that 
cannot be overridden by Congressional action.45  The Supreme Court has 
proposed that these requirements are essential to the separation of powers 
because they ensure that the courts do not adjudicate general grievances.46  
Although the rights asserted by Defenders of Wildlife in Lujan were public 
rights, the Court explained that the standing requirements set forth in that case 
applied to private rights cases as well.47 
Because of the way standing requirements have evolved, the Court has 
tailored Article III standing requirements for certain private rights.48  These 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 297.  See also infra Parts I.B and I.C. 
 41. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and] to Controversies . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 42. 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 (1992). 
 43. Id.  560–61. 
 44. Id. 560 (internal quotations omitted).  Several wildlife and environmental conservation 
organizations sought to enjoin the promulgation of the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of 
the reach of the Endangered Species Act because it construed the Act as inapplicable to U.S. 
projects overseas.  Id. at 562–63.  Defenders of Wildlife argued that it had standing to challenge 
the claim because it desired to observe endangered species overseas and might not be able to if the 
environmental regulations did not apply abroad.  Id. at 558–59.  The Court determined that the 
evidence submitted to support the Defenders of Wildlife’s alleged injury was insufficient to satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement.  Id. at 564–67.  None of the plaintiffs had shown specific plans to 
travel abroad to observe the animals nor their potential interest in studying the animals that may be 
harmed should the regulation not apply abroad.  Id. at 564. 
 45. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 59–60 (4th ed. 2003).  But see Antonin 
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) (“Personally, I find this bifurcation [between prudential and 
constitutional standing] unsatisfying—not least because it leaves unexplained the Court’s source of 
authority for simply granting or denying standing . . . . [I believe that] the Court must always hear 
the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“[I]n ignoring the concrete injury requirement . . . , [the 
courts or Congress] would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct 
constitutional role of the Third Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ 
and ‘Controversies’ that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.”).  See 
also Hessick, supra note 28, at 299–300 (“[A]s late as 1980 the Court expressly rejected the 
formalist notion that standing was based on separation of powers and instead based the requirement 
on the functional ground that it would improve the quality of litigation . . . .”). 
 47. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.  See also Hessick, supra note 28, at 299–304 (describing how 
Lujan was subsequently applied to private rights cases). 
 48. Scalia, supra note 45, at 885–86. 
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constitute prudential standing requirements and include limitations on third-
party and taxpayer standing as well as the requirement for the claim to fall within 
a challenged statute’s “zone of interests.”49  In the context of standing in chilling 
effect challenges to speech codes, the pre-enforcement doctrine and the 
overbreadth doctrine are two important exceptions to the limitations on third-
party standing.50 
B.  Pre-enforcement Standing 
Pre-enforcement standing covers cases in which “it is not necessary that [the 
plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to 
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional 
rights.”51  In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union,52 the Court 
reviewed the application of this rule in a constitutional challenge to provisions 
in an Arizona labor statute.53  United Farm Workers National Union (UFW) 
alleged that union election procedure statutes, which would result in civil and 
criminal liability if not followed, violated its free speech and association rights.54  
After the lower court decided that these statutes were unconstitutional, Governor 
Babbitt appealed on justiciability grounds, arguing that the statutes did not apply 
to UFW’s conduct.55  Discussing whether a case or controversy existed, the 
Court stated: 
When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of 
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed 
by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 
thereunder, he “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal 
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.”56 
The existence of a “credible threat of prosecution” became the standard for 
establishing injury-in-fact in a pre-enforcement challenge, and subsequent case 
law established several ways it could be satisfied.57 
                                                          
 49. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 60. 
 50. See infra Parts I.B, I.C (describing the pre-enforcement and overbreadth doctrines and 
their importance in preventing a plaintiff from having to expose him or herself to liability or prove 
that a personal right was violated in order to establish standing). 
 51. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). 
 52. 442 U.S. 289 (1979). 
 53. Id. at 292.  This case pre-dates the “injury-in fact” requirement established in Lujan.  See 
supra Part I.A.  Nevertheless, it provides insight into the Court’s approach to justiciability. 
 54. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 449 F. Supp. 449, 450–51 (D. Ariz. 1978). 
 55. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 293, 297. 
 56. Id. at 298 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (emphasis added)). 
 57. See id. (applying the “credible threat of enforcement” standard); see also infra Part I.B.1–
6 (discussing subsequent case law). 
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1.  Previously Engaging in Conduct Arguably Proscribed by the Statute with 
an Intention to Continue 
In Babbitt, the Court found that UFW had standing because it previously 
engaged in the proscribed conduct and intended to do so again in the future.58  
In its 2013 term, the Supreme Court applied this same principle in Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus.59  Susan B. Anthony List (SBA), a pro-life advocacy 
group, challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that prohibited 
allegedly “false statements” in political campaigns as determined by a state 
government commission.60  SBA campaigned against certain members of 
Congress for supporting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and, therefore, 
taxpayer-funded abortion.61  Candidate Driehaus filed a complaint about these 
assertions against SBA before the Ohio Elections Commission (OEC), which 
issued a probable cause finding that SBA violated the statute.62  In response, 
SBA filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the statute violated its First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.63  Driehaus withdrew his claim after he lost 
the election, but SBA’s district court case continued on the amended grounds 
that SBA intended to make similar statements in future elections.64 
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s determination that 
SBA had no standing once the election was over.65  The Court held that SBA 
“alleged a credible threat of enforcement” because it intended to participate in 
future election campaigns in a similar manner.66  The Court also noted that 
                                                          
 58. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 301–03.  The Court reaffirmed this principle in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, in which the plaintiffs challenged a federal statute because it 
“prohibit[ed] them from engaging in certain specified activities” even though they had not been 
punished under the statute.  561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010).  Citing Babbitt, the Court found that 
Humanitarian Law Project had standing because it had engaged in the conduct prohibited under the 
statute prior to its enactment and intended to continue.  Id. at 15–16. 
 59. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
 60. Id. at 2338. 
 61. Id. at 2339.  Whether the ACA constitutes taxpayer-funded abortion is disputed.  Id. at 
2339 n.2. 
 62. Id. at 2339. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2340. 
 65. Id. at 2340–41.  The district court concluded that a sufficient injury-in-fact was not present 
for standing or ripeness.  Id. at 2340.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to ripeness only.  Id. 
 66. Id. at 2343.  The Court also found that the statute “arguably . . . proscribed” SBA’s speech 
and would continue to do so as long as SBA intended to engage in similar speech.  Id. at 2344 
(citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).  The Court also 
found that the threat of future enforcement was “substantial” because of the Commission 
proceedings and the “threat of criminal sanctions” under the statute.  Id. at 2345–46.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court stated, “we need not decide whether that threat [of Commission 
proceedings] standing alone gives rise to Article III injury . . . [because they are] backed by the 
additional threat of criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 2346. 
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SBA’s speech “focuses on the broader issue of support for the ACA,” not just 
Driehaus’ support for it.67 
The Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST) also 
claimed that the Ohio provisions were unconstitutional.68  Because of the 
charges pending against SBA, COAST did not distribute literature in opposition 
to candidates’ support for the ACA as it had intended to do.69  The lower courts 
dismissed this claim for lack of standing and the Supreme Court reversed.70  The 
Court found that COAST had standing because it “ha[d] alleged an intent to 
engage in the same speech that was the subject of a prior enforcement proceeding 
. . . [and] ha[d] been the subject of Commission proceedings in the past.”71 
Both Babbitt and Susan B. Anthony List support the idea that evidence of past 
conduct proscribed by the statute with an intent to continue such conduct is 
sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.72  Further, the credible threat of 
enforcement standard can be satisfied with evidence of prior enforcement, even 
if under separate but similar regulations and for different speech.73 
2.  No Evidence of Past Conduct is Required When the Statute Renders the 
Conduct Futile 
Evidence of past conduct is not always required.74  For example, in Babbitt, 
the Court found that UFW had standing to challenge the statutory election 
procedures even though UFW had not previously engaged or asserted a 
subsequent intention to engage in elections.75  The Court reasoned that UFW had 
not participated in elections because the statute prevented them from doing so in 
an efficient way, thereby making the process “futil[e].”76  Further, “awaiting 
appellees’ participation in an election would not assist [the] resolution of the 
threshold question [of] whether the election procedures are subject to scrutiny 
under the First Amendment at all.”77  Therefore, if a plaintiff demonstrates that 
the challenged regulation renders the desired conduct futile, evidence of past 
conduct is not required. 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 2344 (“Because petitioners’ alleged future speech is not directed exclusively at 
Driehaus, it does not matter whether he ‘may run for office again.’”). 
 68. Id. at 2340, 2346. 
 69. Id. at 2340. 
 70. Id. 2340–41. 
 71. Id. at 2346 (citing COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 543 F. App’x 
490 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated 134 S. Ct. 2840 (2014), in which COAST was charged under OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.22(B)(2) for allegedly tweeting false statements about a ballot proposal). 
 72. See supra notes 58–60, 71 and accompanying text. 
 73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 74. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299–301 (1979). 
 75. Id. at 299. 
 76. Id. at 300. 
 77. Id. at 301. 
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3.  No Evidence of Past Speech is Required When the Statute Renders the 
Speech Illegal 
In Babbitt, UFW argued that its speech was chilled by a consumer publicity 
clause that made “the use of dishonest, untruthful and deceptive publicity” 
unlawful.78  Although UFW did not intend to be dishonest, the statute forced 
them to restrain their publicity efforts because “erroneous statement[s are] 
inevitable in free debate.”79  On this basis, the Court found the facial threat of 
prosecution sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement.80 
Similarly, in Susan B. Anthony List, the challenged statute made it illegal to 
“[p]ost, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a false statement 
concerning a candidate, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”81  Driehaus argued that SBA lacked 
standing “because SBA ha[d] not said it ‘plans to lie or recklessly disregard the 
veracity of its speech.’”82  Referencing Babbitt, the Court stated that, “[n]othing 
in this Court’s decisions requires a plaintiff who wishes to challenge the 
constitutionality of a law to confess that he will in fact violate that law.”83  From 
the Court’s comments in Babbitt and Susan B. Anthony List, it can be inferred 
that misleading statements are a part of everyday discourse.84 
4.  Threat of Enforcement Must Be Directly Tied to Speech 
In Laird v. Tatum,85 the Court considered standing in a First Amendment 
challenge to an Army surveillance program on grounds that it chilled the 
plaintiffs’ speech.86  In response to violent uprisings in the late 1960s, the Army 
began to gather intelligence about lawful political organizations in the event that 
domestic insurrections would require military intervention.87  Tatum, Secretary 
of the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, and several other 
political organizations argued that the gathering of the information chilled their 
speech.88  The Court determined that Tatum did not have standing because the 
intelligence gathering effort did not explicitly prohibit speech, a key 
                                                          
 78. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1385(B)(8) (2014)). 
 79. Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)). 
 80. Id. at 302. 
 81. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (citing OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3517.21(B)(10) (West 2013)). 
 82. Id. at 2344. 
 83. Id. at 2345 (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 301). 
 84. Id. at 2342–43 (explaining that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate”) 
(quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 301). 
 85. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. Id. at 3–6. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
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differentiating factor relative to other pre-enforcement cases.89  Therefore, when 
challenging a regulation for its chilling effect on speech, standing under the pre-
enforcement doctrine requires that the regulation directly proscribe speech.90 
5.  Government Comments on Enforcement 
To disprove a plaintiff’s allegation of a threat of enforcement under a 
challenged statute, the government will sometimes state its intention not to 
enforce the statute in certain circumstances, as was the case in United States v. 
Stevens.91  Stevens brought a facial First Amendment challenge to a federal 
statute that criminalized commercial-use depictions of animal cruelty.92  In 
response, the government argued that it would use discretion in enforcing the 
challenged statute.93  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that “the 
First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the 
mercy of noblesse oblige.  We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute 
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”94  Therefore, 
government statements about the non-enforcement of a regulation do not 
automatically nullify the credible threat of the enforcement requirement in a pre-
enforcement challenge.95 
6.  Reputational Risk is a Sufficient Injury 
The Court has also found the potential reputational damage resulting from a 
negative statutory classification of speech a sufficient injury.96  In Meese v. 
Keene,97 an attorney wishing to show films classified as “political propaganda” 
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 193898 challenged the Act’s 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 12–14.  Laird was confirmed in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.  133 S. Ct. 
1138, 1152–53 (2013).  Amnesty International and several other plaintiffs argued that they were 
injured by the likelihood that the government would record their speech under the FISA 
surveillance program at some point.  Id. at 1145–46.  The Court determined that the injury was too 
speculative to establish standing.  Id. at 1143. 
 90. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11–13; see also supra Part I.B.1. 
 91. 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). 
 92. Id. at 461–67.  Stevens owned a business that profited from the creation and sale of dog-
fighting videos.  Id. at 466.  Stevens was convicted of violating the statute and moved to dismiss 
the charges because the statute was “facially invalid under the First Amendment.”  Id. at 467. 
 93. Id. at 480. 
 94. Id.  The Court explained that the mere fact that the government had to qualify its use of 
the statute indicated its possible unconstitutionality.  Id. (“[This statement] is pertinent only as an 
implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems with a more natural reading.”).  
See also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining that the 
plaintiff had standing even though the university ceased using the challenged provision during the 
litigation because the university continued to argue for the constitutionality of its program and did 
not state whether it would subsequently reinstate the provision). 
 95. See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480. 
 96. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473–74 (1987). 
 97. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 98. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (1995). 
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definition of “political propaganda” on First Amendment grounds.99  In 
determining whether the Act injured Keene, the Court found that showing films 
“classified as ‘political propaganda’ . . . would substantially harm his chances of 
reelection and would adversely affect his reputation in the community.”100  
Although he could have distributed disclaimers about the content, the Court 
determined that the reputational risk was a sufficient injury.101 
C.  The First Amendment “Overbreadth” Exception to the Prudential 
Limitation on Third-Party Standing 
One of the prudential limitations on standing is the limitation on third-party 
standing.102  However, if a plaintiff has suffered another form of injury, he or 
she may establish standing based on the violation of a third-party’s First 
Amendment rights even when the relevant government conduct has not violated 
his or her First Amendment rights personally.103  This exception to the prudential 
rule is called the “overbreadth doctrine” and is applied when a plaintiff claims 
that a law violates the First Amendment because it is overly broad.104 
The Court has discussed the requirements of the overbreadth doctrine in many 
cases.105  In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,106 several civil servants challenged a state 
statute restricting their political activity.107  Broadrick acknowledged that the 
statute properly proscribed his conduct,108 but argued that it was facially 
unconstitutional because it was overbroad and vague.109  The Court 
acknowledged that in First Amendment overbreadth challenges the plaintiff was 
not always required to engage in conduct regulated by the statute.110  Instead, 
plaintiffs “are permitted to challenge a statute . . . because of a judicial prediction 
or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the 
                                                          
 99. Meese, 481 U.S. at 467–68. 
 100. Id. at 474. 
 101. Id. at 475–76. 
 102. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 83–84 (“[A] plaintiff can assert only injuries that he or 
she has suffered; a plaintiff cannot present the claims of third parties who are not part of the 
lawsuit.”). 
 103. Id. at 87. 
 104. Id. at 88 (explaining that this exception arises from the chilling effect that an overbroad 
law has on protected speech). 
 105. See, e.g., Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 106. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
 107. Id. at 602.  Although Broadrick is frequently cited for establishing the overbreadth 
doctrine, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the third-party conduct 
allegedly chilled by the statute was not plainly in the statute’s “legitimate sweep.”  Id. at 615–16. 
 108. Id. at 609–10. 
 109. Id. at 606–07. 
 110. Id. at 612. 
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court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”111  In 
other words, plaintiffs have standing to challenge a statute because of the 
statute’s chilling effect. 
The Court reiterated this position in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph 
H. Munson Company.112  Munson, a company that promoted fundraising events, 
challenged a statute that restricted the amount of contributions charities could 
pay to cover solicitation costs.113  Out of fear of punishment under the statute, a 
charity refused to enter into a contract with Munson, thereby costing the 
company business.114  Although the charity did not provide evidence of its 
inability to bring its own suit,115 the Court found that Munson had standing 
because “challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the 
benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society—to prevent the statute from 
chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.”116  
However, Munson still had to demonstrate an injury under the challenged law, 
even if not a violation of its First Amendment rights.117  The Court then 
considered if this injury would allow Munson to “satisfactorily . . . frame the 
issues in the case.”118  The Court found Munson’s loss of business was an 
adequate injury and provided sufficient incentive for him to properly argue the 
case.119 
                                                          
 111. Id. (summarizing the Court’s holding in Dombroski v. Pfister that “attacks on overly broad 
statutes [did not require] that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could 
not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”  380 U.S. 479, 486 
(1965)). 
 112. 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984). 
 113. Id. at 950–51. 
 114. Id. at 954. 
 115. Id. at 957.  This is unique because one of the third-party standing exceptions is instances 
in which an injured party is unlikely to be able to sue.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 84. 
 116. Munson, 467 U.S. at 958. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  The latter issue is a prudential standing standard demonstrating the Court’s concern 
that if a plaintiff does not have a great enough personal stake in the case, the requisite adversarial 
positioning and the arguments necessary to make a proper constitutional decision will not exist.  Id. 
at 956.  See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining that the prohibition on third-
party standing was meant “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 83 (explaining that the third-party standing limitation 
is thought to “improve[] the quality of litigation and judicial decision-making”). 
 119. Munson, 467 U.S. at 958.  The overbreadth doctrine is not without limits.  In Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, the Court emphasized that it should only be employed as a “last resort.”  413 U.S. 
601, 613 (1973).  The Court explained: 
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First 
Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally 
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as 
to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.  
Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine.  
It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.  Facial overbreadth 
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D.  Standing and Academic Freedom 
Largely through a series of Cold War era cases, the Court has given full 
protection for First Amendment rights in academia.  In Shelton v. Tucker,120 
teachers and teacher associations challenged the constitutionality of a statute that 
required all employees of state-supported educational institutions to annually 
file a list of organizations to which they belonged or contributed.121  In finding 
the statute an unconstitutional deprivation of associational rights, the Court 
stated that “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools.”122 
This concern was also demonstrated in Healy v. James,123 in which the Court 
held a state college’s decision not to officially recognize an organization 
unconstitutional.124  The state college refused to recognize the organization 
partially on the basis that the “organization’s philosophy was antithetical to the 
school’s policies.”125  In response, the Court stated that “[t]he college classroom 
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we 
break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to 
safeguarding academic freedom.”126 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York,127 the Court 
found a requirement that all professors at public schools sign a certificate stating 
that they were not and had not been a communist unconstitutionally 
                                                          
has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the 
challenged statute. 
Id.  The Court also noted that the overbreadth exception should be applied more strictly as the 
arguably unprotected behavior moves from “pure speech” to conduct.  Id. at 614. 
 120. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
 121. Id. at 482–83. 
 122. Id. at 487.  The Court also cited the concurring opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff, which 
stated: 
[I]n view of the nature of the teacher’s relation to the effective exercise of the rights 
which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition 
of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the 
safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation.  Such unwarranted inhibition 
upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of 
the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution 
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers. 
344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952). 
 123. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 124. Id. at 183–84. 
 125. Id. at 174–75, 183–84.  The organization was the Students for a Democratic Society, 
which was instrumental in sometimes violent protests on college campuses across the country 
during the 1960s.  Id. at 171.  The Central Connecticut State College (CCSC) chapter at issue had 
declared its independence from international movements, but the President was not satisfied that 
this was true.  Id. at 172, 174–75.  After outlining various errors with the First Amendment claim, 
the Court remanded the case because the facts were ambiguous enough to leave open the possibility 
that non-recognition was permissible.  Id. at 184–85. 
 126. Id. at 180–81 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 127. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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overbroad.128  The University imposed the requirement to ensure compliance 
with a state statute that required removal of employees who would potentially 
“utter[] any treasonable or seditious word or words.”129  Keyishian sued after his 
contract was not renewed when he refused to comply.130  In its ruling, the Court 
reiterated the notion of academic freedom expressed in Shelton stating, 
“[academic] freedom is . . . a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”131  The 
Court also observed that “[t]he danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise 
of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which 
clearly inform teachers what is being proscribed.”132  These cases support the 
extra vigilance required for free speech claims in academia.133 
II.  CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE OVER THE THRESHOLD EVIDENCE REQUIRED 
TO ESTABLISH A “CREDIBLE THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT” 
Article III standing requires that the plaintiff allege a concrete injury, but in 
cases where injury would result only after the plaintiff subjects himself to 
punishment, injury can be shown through a “credible threat of enforcement.”134  
The Supreme Court has tailored the injury-in-fact requirements for “pre-
enforcement” challenges wherein the self-censorship provoked by the threat of 
prosecution is itself an injury that fulfills this prong of the standing 
requirements.135  The courts have also tailored these requirements when the 
proscribed conduct arguably violates an individual’s First Amendment rights.136  
And in academic settings, the Court finds First Amendment rights of particular 
importance.137 
                                                          
 128. Id. at 592–93. 
 129. Id. at 593. 
 130. Id. at 592.  Several other teachers also sued and all sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief.  Id. 
 131. Id. at 603.  Earlier cases, like Keyishian, focused on “a person’s liberty to work in his 
chosen profession free from political scrutiny.”  Julia H. Margretta, Comment, Taking Academic 
Freedom Back to the Future: Refining the “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 7 LOY. J. 
PUB. INT. L 1, 1–2 (2005).  However, more recent theories seem to use the notion of academic 
freedom to ensure that institutions run with minimal outside interference.  Id.  For example, in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court’s decision to uphold race-based admissions processes looked at the 
importance of “[t]he freedom of the university to make its own judgments as to education.”  539 
U.S. 306, 329 (2003), superseded by constitutional amendment, MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (quoting 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).  One explanation for this 
difference may be that Keyishian was a First Amendment case and Grutter was not. 
 132. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604. 
 133. See supra notes 122, 125–26, 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 134. Supra Part I.B. 
 135. See supra Part I.B.1–4. 
 136. See supra Part I.C. 
 137. See supra Part I.D. 
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Nevertheless, the circuit courts are split regarding the application of these 
standards to standing in chilling effect challenges to public university speech 
codes.138  To establish an injury-in-fact, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits require 
actual enforcement against the plaintiff or a similarly situated person.139  On the 
other hand, the Third Circuit has found standing when the plaintiff simply 
alleges that his intended speech falls within the speech punishable under the 
challenged code.140 
A.  Standing Requires Concrete Evidence of Enforcement 
Doe v. University of Michigan141 is the first reported case in which a student 
litigated a challenge to a university speech code.142  Doe was a graduate student 
concerned that his discussion of theories asserting biological differences 
between sexes and races would label him a “sexist” and “racist,” therefore, 
subjecting him to punishment under the school’s speech code.143  As a result, his 
speech was chilled and he challenged the code as facially overbroad and 
vague.144 
Under the pre-enforcement standing doctrine, the court found that Doe was 
qualified to litigate his claim because he rightly perceived a credible threat of 
enforcement based on the history of the policy’s enactment and past 
enforcement:145 the university created the policy in response to certain students’ 
racial remarks that offended other students,146 the policy’s interpretive guide 
included examples of punishable speech that mirrored the statements Doe 
intended to make,147 and the school had enforced the policy against other 
students for discussing controversial ideas in class.148  In subsequent cases, the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits similarly required that the plaintiff provide specific 
                                                          
 138. Challenges to public university speech codes on chilling effect grounds that have actually 
gone to trial are limited.  See Majeed, supra note 10, at 488–94 (providing an overview of each of 
the cases).  Those in which standing has been an issue are the five discussed infra Parts II.A–B, III.  
However, groups like FIRE continue to support students in challenging speech codes in less formal 
ways.  See Free Speech, THE FIRE, http://www.thefire.org/category/cases/free-speech/ (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2014). 
 139. See infra notes 158–76 and accompanying text. 
 140. See infra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
 141. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 142. Majeed, supra note 10, at 488; Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853–54 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989). 
 143. Doe, 721 F. Supp at 858.  The speech code was in the form of an anti-discrimination 
disciplinary policy that regulated speech based on location and type, the violation of which could 
result in sanctions from formal reprimands to expulsion.  Id. at 856–57. 
 144. Id. at 858. 
 145. Id. at 859–61. 
 146. Id. at 860. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 860–61. 
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evidence of enforcement when challenging a public university speech code, 
essentially requiring an actual threat of punishment.149 
In Lopez v. Candaele,150 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling 
that the plaintiff had standing to challenge a college speech code.151  Lopez was 
a student at Los Angeles City College (LACC), which adhered to the L.A. 
Community College District’s sexual harassment policy.152  While giving an 
informative speech to his Speech 101 class about God’s impact on his life, Lopez 
was halted by the professor when he stated that marriage was to be between a 
man and a woman.153  Lopez notified the Dean of Student Affairs about the 
incident and, upon learning this, the professor threatened Lopez with the 
possibility of expulsion.154  The Dean asserted that action was taken against the 
professor who had not acted in accordance with the school’s policies, but no 
action was taken against Lopez.155 
Lopez asserted a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that the policy 
was overbroad and vague.156  The district court found that Lopez had standing 
because he was a student at LACC who had censored his speech based on a 
legitimate fear that he could be punished under the sexual harassment policy.157  
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Lopez had not established an injury 
because he had not “ma[d]e a clear showing that his intended speech . . . gave 
rise to a specific and credible threat of adverse action.”158 
To determine whether Lopez established a credible threat of enforcement, the 
court considered whether he showed a “reasonable likelihood” that the policy 
would be administered against him, whether he intended to violate the law, and 
whether the terms or the government’s interpretation of the policy rendered it 
inapplicable to him.159  The court found that Lopez failed to meet these 
                                                          
 149. See, e.g., Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Matteson’s comment 
does not indicate that Lopez’s speech on marriage or religion would constitute sexual harassment 
or otherwise violate the sexual harassment policy.  Nor does Matteson’s comment constitute a threat 
to initiate proceedings if Lopez made such remarks on marriage or religion.”); Rock for Life-
UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 548 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the plaintiffs [did] not 
allege facts suggesting that [University of Maryland, Baltimore County] officials ever threatened 
to punish their speech as sexual harassment”). 
 150. 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 151. Id. at 784.  The district court found that “Lopez had standing to bring a facial challenge 
to the policy because it applied to Lopez by virtue of his enrollment at LACC, the policy likely 
reached the speech in which Lopez wanted to engage, and Lopez has censored himself for fear of 
discipline under the policy.”  Id. 
 152. Id. at 781. 
 153. Id. at 782–83. 
 154. Id. at 783. 
 155. Id. at 783–84. 
 156. Id. at 784. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 781. 
 159. Id. at 786. 
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requirements, giving minimal consideration to his claim of self-censorship.160  
For example, the court stated that “[c]omparing Lopez’s past and proposed 
future speech to the plain language of the District’s sexual harassment policy, 
we do not see . . . how the policy applies to him.”161  In other words, what 
mattered was the court’s perception of chilled speech, rather than Lopez’s 
perception.162 
The Fourth Circuit resolved a pre-enforcement speech code challenge 
similarly.  In Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski,163 the court ruled that a pro-
life student organization, Rock for Life, did not have standing to bring a facial 
challenge against the University of Maryland Baltimore County’s (UMBC) code 
of conduct and sexual harassment policies on chilling effect grounds.164  Rock 
for Life sought approval to display pro-life posters on campus, but school 
administrators denied their request to have the display in the University Plaza 
Center after commenting that “students might feel ‘emotionally harassed’ by the 
display.”165  Eventually the administration agreed to allow the display at another 
location, the Commons Terrace, but subsequently changed the location another 
two times, including once while Rock for Life was setting up the display.166  The 
final location was the much less “trafficked” North Lawn, rather than the 
Commons Terrace.167  Further, when the group requested permission to show 
the display at the Commons Terrace after the first display occurred without 
issue, the request was denied.168 
Rock for Life sued on the basis that the facilities use policy, code of conduct, 
and sexual harassment policy chilled its speech in violation of its right to free 
expression.169  The court acknowledged the more lenient pre-enforcement 
standing requirements in First Amendment cases, but emphasized the need for 
Rock for Life to provide concrete evidence of an injury-in-fact.170 
                                                          
 160. Id. at 792.  However, the court’s conclusion fails to acknowledge the numerous examples 
of how the school’s sexual harassment policy could be broadly interpreted.  See, e.g., Answering 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 50–55, Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
56238) (“Lopez has previously discussed and desires to discuss in the future his Christian views on 
politics, morality, social issues, religion, and the like. . . . Due to the constant threat of enforcement 
of the speech code . . . Lopez has modified his behavior and self-censored his speech . . . .”). 
 161. Lopez, 630 F.3d at 790. 
 162. Id. at 792 (“[O]ur inquiry into injury-in-fact does not turn on the strength of plaintiffs’ 
concerns about a law, but rather on the credibility of the threat that the challenged law will be 
enforced against them.”). 
 163. 411 F. App’x 541 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 164. Id. at 549. 
 165. Id. at 543–45. 
 166. Id. at 544–45. 
 167. Id. at 545. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 545, 549. 
 170. Id. at 548. 
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In considering whether the sexual harassment policy inflicted a concrete 
injury on Rock for Life, the court applied the overbreadth exception to third-
party standing.171  Citing Lopez, the court noted that it would be sufficient for a 
plaintiff to show how the policy could be enforced in the future or to provide 
evidence of a threat to apply or the actual application of the policy against the 
plaintiff or another “similarly-situated part[y].”172  The court explained that the 
injury of “subjective chill requires some specific action on the part of the 
defendant in order for the litigant to demonstrate an injury-in-fact.”173  The court 
determined that Rock for Life satisfied neither of these requirements, in part 
because the University permitted the display, albeit after changing the location 
several times.174  Further, despite the UMBC general counsel’s concern that the 
display would “emotionally harass[]” students and the university police’s 
routine investigation of “harassment incidents involving speech,”175 the court 
found no evidence of threatened punishment under the sexual harassment 
policy.176 
Lopez and Rock for Life-UMBC establish the Fourth and Ninth Circuit view 
that in pre-enforcement claims, the credible threat of enforcement needed to 
establish injury-in-fact requires actual threatened or enforced punishment.177  
                                                          
 171. Id. at 547–48. 
 172. Id. at 548. 
 173. Id. at 549 (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2008)).  The 
University amended the Code of Conduct so that it was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, 
but the plaintiffs retained their suit on the basis that the administration’s use of the language 
contained in the original policy chilled their speech.  Id. 
 174. Id. at 548–49.  “[T]he plaintiffs [cannot] characterize the defendants’ decision to move 
the GAP display to the North Lawn as a non-disciplinary enforcement of the code.”  Id. at 549. 
 175. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 34–35, Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 
F. App’x 541 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1892). 
 176. Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 548–49.  “If the defendants considered the display 
to be emotional harassment, then it was equally so on either the North Lawn or the Commons 
Terrace.”  Id. at 549.  This statement is questionable because the plaintiffs allege that the Commons 
Terrace is “highly-trafficked” and the North Lawn is not, demonstrating that the school’s intention 
may have been to restrict the message by reducing the audience.  See Opening Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee at 5. 
 177. See Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 786 (9th Cir. 2010); Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. 
App’x at 547.  At first glance, the Doe v. University of Michigan decision seems to indicate that 
courts in the Sixth Circuit have the same standard as the Fourth and Ninth.  721 F. Supp. 852, 859 
(E.D. Mich. 1989).  Yet, in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, the Sixth Circuit allowed 
students to assert an overbreadth challenge to the University’s discriminatory harassment policy, 
even though the university had not applied it against them.  55 F.3d 1177, 1180–82 (6th Cir. 2004).  
The University charged its basketball coach, Dambrot, with violating the harassment policy for 
using the word “nigger” in a game locker room session and terminated his employment.  Id. at 
1180–81.  Dambrot sued in part alleging that the termination violated his First Amendment rights.  
Id. at 1181.  His players also sued claiming the policy was overbroad and vague and infringed upon 
First Amendment rights.  Id.  Although standing was not at issue, the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower 
court’s decision for the student plaintiffs that the policy was overbroad citing Broadrick and Doe 
amongst other cases.  Id. at 1182–83. 
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Therefore, in these circuits, a plaintiff’s subjective claim of chilled speech is 
insufficient.178 
B.  Standing Only Requires a Plaintiff’s Statement of Intended Speech and 
How It Could Be Punishable Under the Challenged Code 
The Third Circuit has interpreted the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III 
standing in pre-enforcement challenges less strictly than the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits, finding the standing requirements satisfied solely based on the 
plaintiff’s assertion that a speech code had a chilling effect.179 
In Bair v. Shippensburg University,180 a current student and a former student 
of Shippensburg University challenged various sections of its code of conduct 
on overbreadth grounds.181  They asserted that they were “reluctant” to speak 
about controversial issues and were members of campus organizations that stood 
for beliefs potentially punishable under the code.182  The court interpreted the 
overbreadth doctrine to permit “facial review and invalidation [of a regulation], 
even though its application in the case under consideration may be 
constitutionally unobjectionable . . . ‘based on an appreciation that the very 
existence of some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive 
activity of others not before the Court.’”183  The court found the plaintiffs’ 
allegations of chill as a sufficient injury, stating that they “constitute harm that 
is more than merely speculative . . . [because they] have asserted that both of 
their past, and Walter Bair’s continuing, fears of prosecution . . . have had a 
chilling effect on their speech.”184  The court required no other evidence.185 
The Third Circuit affirmed the Shippensburg approach in McCauley v. 
University of the Virgin Islands.186  McCauley, a University of the Virgin Islands 
(UVI) student who faced harassment charges, challenged several provisions of 
                                                          
 178. See, e.g., Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 549 (finding that “[a]ny subjective fear 
of disciplinary measures that the plaintiffs might have felt never materialized into an actual, 
objective harm”); Lopez, 630 F.3d at 792 (stating that “our inquiry into injury-in-fact does not turn 
on the strength of plaintiffs’ concerns about a law”). 
 179. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2010); Bair v. 
Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 180. 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 181. Id. at 361–63, 367.  The Code of Conduct included phrases such as “the expression of 
one’s beliefs should be communicated in a manner that does not provoke, harass, intimidate, or 
harm another.”  Id. at 363. 
 182. Id. at 365. 
 183. Id. at 364–65 (quoting Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 184. Id. at 365.  In contrast, the Doe court analyzed Doe’s standing based purely on the pre-
enforcement exception.  Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858–61 (1989). 
 185. Bair, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (holding that “[o]n th[e] basis [of Bair’s fear of prosecution], 
we find that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the University Speech 
Code”). 
 186. 618 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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the student code of conduct, including those under which he was not 
convicted.187  In the lower court, McCauley claimed that the unenforced policies 
were overbroad and had a “chilling effect on [his] and other students’ right to 
freely and openly engage in appropriate discussions on theories, beliefs, ideas, 
and to debate such ideas with persons holding opposing viewpoints.”188  The 
lower court found that he had standing for these claims because he had been 
disciplined under other provisions of the code of conduct.189  The Third Circuit 
upheld this decision on the basis that the court should “freely grant[] standing to 
raise overbreadth claims.”190 
Unlike the approach taken in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, both of which 
have adopted a different rule for standing and pre-enforcement requirements and 
rejected the McCauley rule, the Third Circuit does not require evidence of threats 
or actual enforcement of a policy to establish standing.191  The plaintiff merely 
needs to provide an example of his or her intended speech and an explanation of 
why the challenged policy chilled his or her speech.192 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE CIRCUITS’ DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STANDING 
When determining whether a plaintiff has standing for a claim that a speech 
code violates his free speech rights on chilling effect grounds, the courts 
incorporate the pre-enforcement and overbreadth doctrines into the injury-in-
fact standard.193 
The pre-enforcement doctrine allows citizens to challenge an unconstitutional 
government policy without first needing to subject themselves to prosecution by 
engaging in the proscribed activity.194  The overbreadth doctrine allows 
plaintiffs to assert the claims of third-parties when arguing that a law prohibits 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 236–39.  The court considered McCauley’s standing under each of the challenged 
provisions separately.  Id.  An example of one of the provisions McCauley challenged, even though 
it had not been enforced, is a prohibition on “conduct which . . . compels the victim to seek 
assistance in dealing with the distress.”  Id. at 239. 
 188. McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., No. 2005-188, 2009 WL 2634368, at *4 (D. V.I. Aug. 21, 
2009), rev’d, 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 189. Id. 
 190. McCauley, 618 F.3d at 238 (citing Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir. 1991)).  
McCauley also challenged a policy that required students to report misconduct, but the court found 
no standing because the policy did not prohibit speech, as had the other challenged provisions for 
which he had standing.  Id. at 239. 
 191. See id. at 238–39. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See supra Part II (discussing how the circuit courts have incorporated the pre-enforcement 
and overbreadth doctrines into their determination of whether a plaintiff has shown injury-in-fact). 
 194. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that there was an actual 
controversy for standing purposes in a § 1983 action when petitioner was threatened with arrest 
under state criminal trespass law in order to stop him from handing out pamphlets that protested 
the Vietnam war). 
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speech that should be protected by the First Amendment.195  Unlike the Third 
Circuit, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have not found allegations of chilled 
speech as a sufficient injury-in-fact, even under the pre-enforcement doctrine; 
therefore, plaintiffs have been unable to satisfy the personal injury requirement 
of the overbreadth doctrine.196  One explanation for this difference in treatment 
is the lack of clarity as to how these doctrines should apply in chilling effect 
cases.197 
A.  The Circuits’ Different Approaches to the Overbreadth Doctrine 
To establish an injury-in-fact, plaintiffs must articulate their belief that their 
intended speech could be punishable under the challenged policy.198  In Doe v. 
University of Michigan, Doe was able to satisfy this requirement because the 
University of Michigan created its speech code in direct response to racial 
incidents on campus and because there was substantial evidence that Doe’s 
speech was the type targeted by the policy.199 
In Lopez v. Candaele, when Lopez argued that his speech was chilled, the 
court deemed the link between his speech and the policy too “attenuated.”200  
The court made this decision despite the policy website’s recommendation that 
when students are “unsure if certain comments or behavior are offensive do not 
do it, do not say it,”201 and the professor’s threat of expulsion along with 
students’ expressions of offense.202  Similarly, Rock for Life provided a detailed 
explanation of how its speech was subject to prohibition under the challenged 
                                                          
 195. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 87–89. 
 196. Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because Lopez fails to 
establish the necessary injury in fact, he cannot raise the claims of third parties as part of an 
overbreadth challenge.”); Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 547–49 (3d Cir. 
2010) (applying the Lopez court’s approach to the plaintiff’s injury-in-fact under the overbreadth 
doctrine and finding the plaintiff did not have standing). 
 197. This confusion is similar to the confusion over the distinction between public and private 
rights and Article III standing doctrine broadly.  See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 28, at 299–306 
(describing various inconsistencies in the Court’s approach to injury-in-fact arising from 
misunderstandings over the nature of public and private rights).  At one time, plaintiffs were only 
required to establish an injury-in-fact when claiming the violation of a public right.  See supra notes 
36–38 and accompanying text.  Over time, the Supreme Court also applied the injury-in-fact 
requirement to private rights claims, and in so doing created several nuanced standards that lower 
courts have to navigate, such as the pre-enforcement and overbreadth doctrines.  See supra notes 
38–39 and accompanying text; supra Part II. 
 198. See, e.g., Lopez, 630 F.3d at 789–91 (“[W]e consider both Lopez’s stated intent to violate 
the policy and the likelihood that the District or LACC will enforce the policy against Lopez.”); 
Bair v. Shippensburg Univ. 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 365 (“Plaintiffs have asserted that both of their 
past, and Walter Bair’s continuing, fears of prosecution pursuant to the Code of Conduct have had 
a chilling [effect] on their speech.  On this basis, we find that Plaintiffs have standing . . . .”). 
 199. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854–55, 861 (1989). 
 200. Lopez, 630 F.3d at 789. 
 201. Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 09-56238), 2010 WL 4622608, at *7. 
 202. Lopez, 630 F.3d at 783. 
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policy.203  However, the Rock for Life-UMBC court disregarded this argument 
because it considered Rock for Life’s analysis as insufficient evidence of 
UMBC’s intent to punish them under the policy.204 
In contrast, the McCauley and Shippensburg courts did not assess the validity 
of the plaintiffs’ statements.  In McCauley, the court interpreted Broadrick to 
mean that McCauley could make an overbreadth claim—even though the 
University had not enforced certain challenged policies against him—because 
the University disciplined him under other provisions of the policy.205  Similarly, 
the Shippensburg court found that Bair’s prior and continuing fear of 
punishment “constitute[d] harm that is more than merely speculative,” and, 
therefore, a sufficient injury.206 
B.  The Courts’ Different Approaches to Comments by University 
Administrators Regarding Speech Code Enforcement 
In denying that the plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact, both the Lopez and 
Rock for Life-UMBC courts relied on university administrators’ statements about 
their intention to not enforce the challenged policies against the plaintiffs’ 
speech.207  The student group in Rock for Life-UMBC argued that “[t]he speech 
codes’ mere existence indicates [the college’s] intent to enforce them since 
public institutions do not enact dead-letter policies.”208  However, the court 
found it determinative that university officials had not charged Rock for Life 
under the sexual harassment policy when it had previously exhibited its 
controversial display.209 
The outcome in Lopez and Rock for Life-UMBC may have been different if 
the courts had considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens v. United 
States, which was rendered after the Lopez oral argument and just a few months 
                                                          
 203. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellant at 38–41, Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 
F. App’x 541 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1982) (explaining that not only did one of the administrators 
express concern that the displays at issue would impact “emotional safety,” the display itself was 
about abortion, which it argued was clearly linked to the “issues of sex, gender roles, and sexuality” 
proscribed by the sexual harassment policy). 
 204. Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 548–49.  The court also rejected the argument that 
UMBC’s decision to move the display and express concern that the display’s content could illicit a 
negative emotional reaction from other students was a sufficient credible threat of enforcement.  
See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 205. McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2010).  The school enforced 
certain provisions against McCauley, but not the ones for which standing was questioned. Id. 
 206. Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 207. Supra notes 155–61, 174–76 and accompanying text.  In McCauley and Shippensburg, 
comments by the respective universities regarding the enforcement of the challenged policies did 
not appear in the briefs or opinion, if any were made at all. 
 208. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellant at 34, Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. 
App’x 541 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1982). 
 209. Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 548–49. 
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before the Rock for Life-UMBC argument.210  In Stevens, the Court held that the 
government’s comments regarding the non-enforcement of an allegedly 
overbroad statute did not invalidate standing to bring a facial First Amendment 
claim against it.211  Applying this to Lopez and Rock for Life-UMBC, the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuit courts may have made university officials’ invocation of a 
non-enforcement intention less relevant.212  For example, although the LACC 
administrators did not intend to punish Lopez under the circumstances in which 
the professor initially threatened action against him, this did not necessarily 
preclude him from fear of punishment or actual punishment in the future if he 
were to engage in similar speech.213 
IV.  STANDING REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SATISFIED BY A PLAINTIFF’S 
STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE INTENDED SPEECH AND HOW IT IS CHILLED BY 
THE CHALLENGED POLICY 
Free speech is an individual right that should be treated as private rights were 
prior to the creation of modern standing doctrine: a plaintiff should only need to 
allege an invasion of this legal right to have Article III standing when asserting 
a First Amendment challenge to a public university speech code on chilling 
effect grounds.214  The importance of the right to free speech is somewhat 
reflected in the nuances available to plaintiffs to establish an injury-in-fact, such 
as the pre-enforcement and overbreadth doctrines.215  Under only very narrow 
                                                          
 210. U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), was decided on April 20, 2010.  Oral argument in 
Lopez was on March 3, 2010, while that in Rock for Life-UMBC was on September 21, 2010. 
 211. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 212. This assumes that college or university officials had not amended the challenged 
provisions to remove the objectionable content.  However, even then, courts have found that 
amendments to challenged statutes are not necessarily determinative to the standing analysis as 
they can be mere litigation tactics.  See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 
972 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 213. Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 11–12, Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 788 
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-56238). 
 214. See supra Part I.A.  The Court seems to reject this notion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992): 
[O]ur generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of 
procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is 
absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted 
right.  Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in 
ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding 
a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third 
Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Controversies” 
that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches. 
Id.  (emphasis added).  However, this statement was made when considering whether the legislative 
branch can convert the public interest into an individual right via statute, which the Court rejects, 
so it is unclear whether this statement applies only to public rights or all rights.  Id. at 576–77. 
 215. See supra Part I.B–C. 
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circumstances can the government abridge this right.216  Plaintiffs with chilling 
effect claims should be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement if they 
provide an example of their intended speech and how it could be chilled under 
the speech code.217 
A.  Chilling Effect Claims Fall Within the Nuances of the Credible Threat of 
Enforcement Standard 
In existing pre-enforcement cases, the Supreme Court has not required 
evidence of enforcement when the statute renders conduct futile or speech 
illegal.218  Further, the Court has found an injury-in-fact when a statute may 
negatively impact the plaintiff’s reputation.219  These rules support the 
satisfaction of the injury-in-fact requirement in chilling effect cases at public 
colleges and universities when a plaintiff asserts that a policy has chilled his 
speech.220 
In Babbitt, the Court did not require UFW to engage in an election in part 
because the intricacies of the process set out in the challenged statute rendered 
the election process futile.221  Similarly, speech codes create processes that 
discourage speech and could render attempts to discuss controversial ideas on 
campus futile, as seen in Rock for Life-UMBC.222  For example, the University 
changed the location of the reserved space twice, including once when Rock for 
Life was setting up the display in a previously agreed upon location.223  Further, 
Rock for Life attempted to negate the potential for violence by suggesting that 
uniformed officers be present, but no agreement could be reached concerning 
who would pay for the officers.224 
In Susan B. Anthony List, the Supreme Court suggested that misleading 
statements are a part of everyday discourse and a plaintiff should not be required 
to admit his intention to lie in order to have standing.225  Given people’s 
differences in upbringing, culture, knowledge, and experience, offense is a 
                                                          
 216. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“[B]ecause First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow 
specificity.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299–300 (1979) 
(holding appellee’s mere reluctance to invoke election procedures because of the potential 
consequences was enough to support an injury-in-fact for standing purposes). 
 218. See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
 219. See supra Part I.B.6. 
 220. See supra Part I.B.1–6. 
 221. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 300–01.  See also supra Part I.B.2. 
 222. See Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 544–45 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(detailing a conflict between a group of college students who wished to set up a pro-abortion display 
on campus and college officials who enforced a policy because of the controversial nature of the 
display). 
 223. Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 544–45. 
 224. Id. at 544. 
 225. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
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natural part of conversation and intellectual discourse.226  In the same way that 
a plaintiff should not have to admit an intention to lie, a plaintiff challenging a 
speech code should not have to admit his intention to offend someone in 
establishing a chilling effect claim.227 
Finally, in Keene, the Supreme Court found that the challenged statute was 
likely to negatively impact Keene’s reputation, which satisfied the injury-in-fact 
requirement.228  The same can be said for students and professors whose speech 
arguably falls within conduct punishable under a speech code.229  For example, 
in Lopez, a professor refused to let Lopez finish his speech about God’s plan for 
marriage and threatened to have him expelled from school.230  Fellow students 
subsequently submitted letters to the Dean of Academic Affairs stating that they 
were “deeply offended” by the “hateful propaganda” included in the speech.231  
For the school to foster an environment where students and professors believe 
they have a right to express their “deep offense” to the Dean of Academic Affairs 
with an expectation that the offender will be punished demonstrates that speech 
codes increase the reputational risk of expressing a controversial idea.232 
B.  The Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ Interpretation of “Credible Threat of 
Enforcement” Defeats the Pre-enforcement Doctrine’s Purpose 
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ more narrow interpretation of the credible 
threat of enforcement requirement defeats the purpose of the pre-enforcement 
doctrine.  In Lopez, the court partially justified its holding with the fact that 
Lopez did not claim that anyone had been punished under the challenged 
policy.233  In applying Lopez, the Fourth Circuit denied Rock for Life’s standing 
by stating that “the plaintiffs do not allege facts suggesting that UMBC officials 
ever threatened to punish their speech as sexual harassment.”234  Such a threat 
would presumably require Rock for Life to speak or announce its intention to 
speak in a way prohibited by the challenged policy prior to suing.235  This defeats 
the pre-enforcement doctrine’s purpose of authorizing a cause of action for 
individuals who have self-censored out of fear of government punishment.236 
                                                          
 226. See Siegel, supra note 21, at 1398–99. 
 227. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2344–45 (2014). 
 228. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987).  See also supra Part I.B.6. 
 229. See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text. 
 230. Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 231. Id. at 783. 
 232. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating how one student was criticized for his religious views). 
 233. Id. at 791. 
 234. Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 548 (4th Cir. 2010).  The court 
noted, however, that “a history of threatened or actual enforcement” would likely be sufficient.  Id. 
(citing Lopez, 630 F.3d at 786). 
 235. See, e.g., id. (discussing that plaintiffs did not show a credible threat of enforcement, 
partially based on the plaintiffs’ inability to show that they intended to speak in a manner that would 
violate the policy). 
 236. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967). 
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C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Misapplication of Laird v. Tatum 
In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit’s application of Laird v. Tatum was also incorrect.  
In finding Lopez’s statement of chilled speech inadequate, the court cited Laird: 
“[m]ere ‘allegations of a subjective “chill” are not an adequate substitute for a 
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.’”237  
However, in Laird the Supreme Court applied that observation to plaintiffs’ 
challenge to an intelligence-gathering operation, not to a policy that penalized 
certain types of speech, as speech codes do.238 
Further, in Laird, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had been subject to 
government surveillance,239 but a student is always subject to the policies of the 
college or university in which he is enrolled.240  To this point, the Laird Court 
differentiated the facts before it from other pre-enforcement First Amendment 
claims by stating that in the other cases “the challenged exercise of governmental 
power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the 
complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, 
proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging.”241  Therefore, it was 
improper for the Ninth Circuit to dismiss Lopez’s claim based on the pre-
enforcement standing requirements set out in Laird. 
D.  Expanding the Overbreadth Doctrine to Any First Amendment Claim 
Properly applied, the overbreadth doctrine permits a plaintiff to bring a claim 
based on the violation of a third-party’s First Amendment rights if this violation 
injures the plaintiff on grounds other than the First Amendment violation 
implicated in the proxy claim for third parties.242  Consistent with this doctrine, 
standing should be granted to public university students or professors 
                                                          
 237. Lopez, 630 F.3d at 787 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)). 
 238. Laird, 408 U.S. at 1–2.  The challenged practice involved the Army gathering information 
in situations in which there was a perceived probability that violence would occur.  Id. at 5–6.  Prior 
to Tatum’s suit, the Senate reviewed the Army’s program for potential Constitutional violations 
and the Army narrowed its application, including requiring the destruction of information gathered 
within sixty days.  Id. at 7–8.  In contrast, the code challenged in Lopez prohibited, amongst other 
things, “verbal, visual, or physical conduct . . . .”  Lopez, 630 F.3d at 781 (emphasis added). 
 239. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14 n.7 (explaining that Tatum largely failed to establish a 
connection between the intelligence-gathering program and any alleged chill and to establish that 
their speech had been chilled). 
 240. The Third Circuit upheld this principle in DeJohn v. Temple University.  537 F.3d 301, 
312 (3d Cir. 2008) (“DeJohn continues to have a relationship with Temple University, and as such, 
continues to be subject to the sexual harassment policy.”).  Lopez made this argument in his brief.  
Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 52–54, Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 09-56238) (“As a currently enrolled student at the College, Lopez must comply with the 
speech code on a daily basis.”).  The district court accepted the proposition but the Ninth Circuit 
did not consider it.  Lopez, 630 F.3d at 784. 
 241. Laird, 408 U.S. at 11–12. 
 242. See supra Part I.C (discussing the “overbreadth doctrine,” which allows a plaintiff to 
obtain standing based on the violation of a third-party’s First Amendment rights). 
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challenging a speech code because they will always suffer from the loss of 
exposure to different viewpoints chilled by the speech code.243 
Students or professors challenging speech codes could assert a similar 
argument to the plaintiff in Munson, which had standing based on its own, non-
First Amendment injury-in-fact.244  Regardless of whether the university 
administration enforced the speech code against the plaintiff or whether the 
speech code chilled the plaintiff’s speech, other students likely self-censored 
themselves.245  For example, in a 2010 survey by the Association of American 
Colleges and Universities, only 30.3 percent of the college seniors and 18.8 
percent of faculty and staff who responded “strongly agreed that ‘[i]t is safe to 
hold unpopular views on campus.’”246  This injures plaintiffs because they are 
not exposed to nor allowed to discuss different ideas and perspectives, which is 
the primary reason that free speech is a constitutionally protected right.247  If a 
student or professor can demonstrate a likelihood that speech could be chilled 
under the challenged speech code, standing should be granted on the assumption 
that the plaintiff would be injured from the resulting chilled speech.248 
                                                          
 243. For example, the injury that the professors and students could assert is the violation of 
their right to receive information.  The Supreme Court recognized this right in Martin v. City of 
Struthers.  319 U.S. 141 (1943).  Martin held: 
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First 
Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but 
they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous 
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.  This freedom embraces the 
right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. 
Id. at 143 (internal citations omitted).  See also Norman B. Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, 
Their Families, and Teachers in the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 367 (1988) 
(describing student’s rights to receive communications). 
 244. Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984). 
 245. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text (discussing the “chilling effect” and its 
contribution to self-censorship); see also infra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing 
perceived hostility towards unpopular views on campus). 
 246. LUKIANOFF, supra note 1, at 54–55 (citing Eric L. Dey et al, Engaging Diverse 
Viewpoints: What is the Campus Client for Perspective-taking?, AM. ASS’N OF COLLS. & UNIVS. 
(2010), http://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/core_commitments/engaging_diverse_view 
points.pdf).  See also Michicko Kakutani, Critic’s Notebook: Debate? Dissent? Discussion? Oh, 
Don’t Go There!, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/23/books/ 
critic-s-notebook-debate-dissent-discussion-oh-don-t-go-there.html (stating that according to one 
professor, “[d]ebate has gotten a very bad name in our culture . . . It’s become synonymous with 
some of the most nonintellectual forms of bullying . . . ”). 
 247. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 503 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).  The Court stated: 
The constitutional right to free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse 
and populous as ours.  It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints 
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity . . . . 
Id. 
 248. See supra Part I.B (discussing pre-enforcement standing where a plaintiff need not be 
subject to arrest or prosecution). 
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E.  Education Deserves Special Treatment 
Pre-enforcement standing is more easily attainable in First Amendment 
claims249 and the overbreadth doctrine demonstrates the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to relax standing in free speech cases.250  It is also appropriate to 
relax standing for First Amendment claims in the educational setting because 
“[t]he primary function of the university is to discover and disseminate 
knowledge by means of research and teaching.  To fulfill this function a free 
interchange of ideas is necessary.”251  Both Lopez and McCauley emphasized 
this contextual consideration in their respective briefs, but neither of their 
adjudicating courts discussed it in their opinions.252  This is a mistake and is 
arguably inconsistent with several cases in which the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the “special concern of the First Amendment” in the educational 
context.253  These include cases in which the Court has considered polices that 
create a “chilling effect” on campus speech.254  Courts should authorize standing 
for students and professors challenging speech codes on chilling effect grounds 
when they simply state what type of protected speech is proscribed and, 
therefore, chilled by the challenged policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment’s protection of free expression is essential, particularly 
on university campuses.255  Historically, a plaintiff would have had standing by 
his mere assertion that his constitutional private right of free expression was 
violated.256  The mistaken application of the injury-in-fact requirement to private 
rights257 has forced the courts to develop various exceptions to accommodate the 
nuances of First Amendment rights, such as the pre-enforcement and 
                                                          
 249. See supra Part I.B.1–6. 
 250. See supra Part I.C. 
 251. C. VANN WOODWARD, CHAIRMAN’S LETTER TO THE FELLOWS OF THE YALE 
CORPORATION 5 (1974), http://www.yale.edu/terc/collectiblesandpublications/specialdocuments/ 
Freedom_Expression/freedom1975.pdf. 
 252. Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 
2010) (No. 09-56238).  McCauley did not make this argument in his briefs but FIRE filed an amicus 
brief in the appeal in which it pointed out the importance of preserving speech rights in the college 
context.  Brief Amicus Curiae for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education in Support of 
Appellant at 5, McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3735). 
 253. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also supra Part I.C 
(discussing the importance of free speech in the educational context). 
 254. See supra Part I.D (explaining judicial discussion of the “chilling effect” upon campus 
speech). 
 255. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the campus as a “marketplace of 
ideas”). 
 256. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (covering standing by assertion of a violation 
of a right). 
 257. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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overbreadth doctrines.258  In light of these distinctions and the importance of 
academic freedom, students and professors should be able to establish standing 
by simply stating how certain arguably protected speech could be chilled under 
the challenged policy.  The rest should be left to the merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 258. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the Court did 
not mean to apply the injury-in-fact standard to private rights cases); see also supra Part I.B 
(explaining pre-enforcement standing) and Part I.C (regarding the overbreadth doctrine). 
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